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We give an entanglement assisted scheme for quantum key distribution. The scheme requires
the maximally entangled 2-qubit state but does not require any quantum storage. The protocol is
unconditionally secure under whatever type of Eve’s attack. The threshold of the channel error rate
for the protocol to produce larger than zero final bit depends on the noisy pattern. In particular,
given the symmetric channel with independent errors, our scheme can tolerate a bit error rate up
to 26% in the 4-state case and 30% in the 6-state case, respectively. These values are higher than
those of all currently known two-level-state schemes without using a quantum storage.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, quantum key distribution (QKD) is different from classical cryptogra-
phy in that an unknown quantum state is in principle not known unless it is disturbed, rather than the conjectured
difficulty of computing certain functions. The first published protocol, proposed in 1984 [1], is called BB84 after its
inventors (C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard.) For a history of the subject, one may see e.g. [2]. In this protocol, the
participants (Alice and Bob) wish to agree on a secret key about which no eavesdropper (Eve) can obtain significant
information. Alice sends each bit of the secret key in one of a set of conjugate bases which Eve does not know, and
this key is protected by the impossibility of measuring the state of a quantum system simultaneously in two conjugate
bases. Since then, studies on QKD are extensive.
Most of the entanglement assisted QKD protocols such as the Lo-Chau protocol [3] are not so practical compared
with the prepare-and-measure protocols such as BB84 [1], 6-state protocol [4], the Gottesman-Lo protocol [6,16] and
so on because normally the entanglement assisted protocols require a quantum storage which is generally believed to
be technically difficult. However, producing the maximally entangled pairs is not a problem by our current technology.
Maximally entangled pairs in polarization space can be robustly produced by the type two spontaneous parametric
down conversion(SPDC) [5]. The proposed QKD protocol in this work does not require any quantum storage, though
it uses the entanglement pairs and the collective measurement. The collective measurement can be done by using
a polarizing beam splitter as we shall show in the section of “experimental realization”. Therefore it is practically
implementable by the currently existing technology.
Normally, the channel for quantum bit transmission is noisy. The error to a qubit caused by the channel noise can
be divided into σx =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, σz
(
1 0
0 −1
)
, σy =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
errors, which represent for a bit flip error only, a phase
flip error only and both error, respectively. The detected bit (or phase) flip error rate is the summation of σx (or
σz) error rate and σy error rate. The most natural noisy channel is the symmetric channel, i.e., the σx, σz , σy errors
are equally distributed. One can take advantage of this type of symmetric channel in the QKD protocol [6]. To be
sure that the channel noise is symmetric, one must use 6-state protocol. In the BB84 protocol, since the σy error
can never be detected or deduced, we have to assume the worst case of zero σy error [6]. This is why the 4-state
protocol can only tolerate a lower error rate than 6-state protocol. This is the reason that the largest tolerable bit
flip error rate or phase flip error rate for BB84 protocol is 25%, lower than that of 6-state protocol, which is 33.3%
[6]. However, in our entanglement assisted protocol, the channel flipping rate upper bound of 25% for the 4-state
protocol is broken. The tolerable channel bit-flip and phase-flip rate is raised to 26% for the symmetric channel. This
is not a strange result if we consider an entanglement purification protocol with bit flip error rejection and phase flip
error rejection alternately: even though σy error is never detected or deduced, the tolerable bit flip rate or phase flip
rate can be as high as 33.3% for the entanglement distillation. In such a case one does not have to make sure of the
σy rate, he can check the bit flip rate and phase flip rate after the purification. If initially the error rate is indeed
symmetrically distributed and the total flipping rate is less than 50%, he must be able to distill highly pure entangled
state finally. This means, with the real entanglement purification, a 4-state protocol can tolerate a flipping rate of
33.3% if the channel noise is symmetric. (One does not have to test whether the channel noise is symmetric in the
protocol, Alice and Bob just go ahead to make the purification even though the rate of σx and the rate of σz are
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larger than 25%. If the channel is symmetric, he will be able to verify that both bit flip rate and phase flip rate are
0 after the purification). In our entanglement assisted protocol, the tolerable bit flip rate or phase flip rate for the
6-state protocol is also raised to 30%. Our entanglement assisted protocol can tolerate the highest error rate among
all proven secure prepare-and-measure protocols raised so far for both 4-state case and 6-state case.
Practically speaking, a quantum channel is normally noisy therefore the raw key string with Bob and the string with
Alice are normally not identical. Moreover, it is possible that, in the case Alice and Bob try to make the quantum
key distribution, the channel noise could actually come from Eve. In such a case the raw key can be significantly
correlated with Eve’s quantum state. Even in the case that no bit flip or phase flip is detected on the subset of
the check bits, the raw key is still not completely reliable or secure because there could be still a few bit flips or
phase flips for the code bits which are unchecked. To obtain the highly reliable and secure key, one has to take the
error correction (EC) and privacy amplification (PA) to the raw key and then use the final key which should be
unconditionally secure and perfectly reliable. Although the classical EC can be used to remove all bit-value errors
(with a high probability) therefore to help Alice and Bob obtain a reliable key, it’s not transparent that whether the
classical PA can really work here: Eve may first store her qubits which are correlated with the raw key. After Alice
and Bob complete the EC and PA, she then takes an optimized measurement to her qubits directly attacking the
final key. A strict mathematical proof for the unconditional security is non-trivial [7–9]. The security proof of QKD
is greatly simplified if one connects this with the quantum entanglement purification protocol (EPP) [10–12]. The
main idea is conceptually simple and clear: Alice and Bob first share a number of raw entanglement pairs and then
purify them to almost maximally entangled pairs and measure each of them to obtain the final key [12]. The strict
mathematical security proof with EPP was given by Lo and Chau [3]. Interestingly, it was then shown by Shor and
Preskill [13] that Lo-Chau entanglement purification based protocol can be reduced to the quantum error correction
(QEC) protocol with one-way communication and the QEC protocol is equivalent to BB84 protocol followed by the
classical EC and PA done by decoding a classical CSS code. Shor-Preskill protocol [13] works as long as the measured
bit flip error and phase flip error rates are less than 11%, the point at which the Shannon rate hits 0. Note that this
threshold is lower than that of certain EPP protocols with two-way communications (2-EPP): the 2-EPP with error
rejection works as long as the summation of measured bit error and flip error rates are less than a 50%. In such a
case, Alice and Bob randomly choose two pairs and measure the parity of 2 qubits in each side and discard both pairs
if the parities disagree and keep one pair and discard the other pair if the parities agree with each other. In such a
way, the bit flip error is reduced if they measure the parity in Z basis; the phase flip error is reduced if they measure
the parity in X basis. X, Y and Z represents the basis in the eigenstates of operator σx, σy and σz respectively. The
vector representation for the two level state is |0〉 =
(
1
0
)
; |1〉 =
(
0
1
)
. This 2-EPP with error rejection done in both
Z basis and X basis cannot be reduced to a classical protocol. In a classical protocol, Alice just sends Bob the qubits
prepared in X or Z (or Y) basis randomly and then they carry out EPP task as if they were sharing a number of
raw entangled pairs. Or equivalently, in a classicalized protocol, Alice had measured her halves of the entangled pairs
before the protocol was started. They can still do the parity comparison on Z basis, but they will not be able to do so
in X basis: they are never able to know what the parity values should be if they had really used entangled pairs here
therefore they don’t know whether they should discard both bits or keep one bit. Very recently, motivated for higher
bit error rate tolerance and higher efficiency, Gottesman and Lo [6] studied the classicalization of 2-EPP. It has been
shown there that a 2-EPP can be classicalized iff their action after the phase parity comparison is deterministic. In
such a case they can carry out the task as if they were doing the 2-EPP on entangled pairs. Based on this observation,
a new QKD protocol was given there [6] with partially two way communications: in removing the bit flip errors, the
error-rejection method is used with two way communication; in removing the phase flip error, the error correction
method is used with one way communication, i.e., Alice asked Bob to measure the syndrome of certain randomly
chosen 3 qubits and Bob will use the majority rule to decide whether to take a phase flip operation to one of the 3
qubits. This method has increased the tolerable bit error rate of noisy channel to 18.9% and 26.4% for 4-state QKD
and 6-state QKD, respectively. Very recently, these values have been upgraded to 20% and 27.4% by Chau [16].
In this paper, we propose a revised scheme which is also uncinditionally secure and which can further increase these
thresholds on bit error rates given the independent channel errors. We propose to let Alice send Bob the quantum
states randomly chosen from { 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉), 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉), |00〉, |11〉}. As we shall see, these states are just the
quantum phase-flip error-rejection (QPFER) code for the BB84 state {|0〉, |1〉, 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉), 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)}. When
Bob receives them, he first decodes each two-qubit code to the one-qubit state (a BB84 state) and then carry out
the rest tasks of EC and PA. In decoding, Bob discards those codes which contains one bit-flip error therefore after
decoding the phase-flip error for the accepted bits are greatly decreased. As we are going to show, we may take this
advantage to increase the threshold of the tolerable bit error rate caused by the s-channel. The advantage of a higher
tolerable error rate is limitted to the cases where the 2-qubit QPFER code works, e.g., in the case that the channel
noise is uncorrelated. But security part of our protocol is unconditional, i.e., it is secure under whatever types of
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attack. In other words, Alice and Bob don’t care about the actual noise pattern (correlated or uncorrelated) in the
QKD, they just test the error rate after decoding and then go ahead to distill the final key by our protocol. The final
key is always secure no matter what type of noise has been actually happened to the raw qubits. Subtle points for
the unconditional security with conditional advantage of the protocol is given in the following section. In particular,
the protocol is totally different from the almost useless protocol which is only secure with uncorrelated channel noise.
II. SUBTLITIES OF UNCONDITIONAL SECURITY WITH CONDITIONAL ADVANTAGE OF OUR
PROTOCOL
To a QKD protocol, one may evaluate it by several criterion, e.g., the security, the efficiency and the key rate. The
unconditional security is the first important thing. Without this prpoerty, the protocol is almost useless even if it
has other advantages such as a high key rate. After all, the reason we use quantum key distribution is due to the
temptation of its unconditional security. In this logic, a conditional secure QKD protocol with unverifiable condition
for security is useless, because it is actually insecure and has lost the assumed advantage to a classical key distribution.
For example if a new protocol is proposed with advantages in efficiency or economy, but the security is only proved
based on the assumption of individual attack, this new protocol is useless unless the proof of unconditional security
is completed, i.e., the proof of the security under whatever type of attack.
An unconditionally secure QKD protocol means that Eve’s information to the final key is exponentially close to 0.
To Alice and Bob, if they carry out that protocol, the worst result there is that Alice and Bob may get 0 bit for the
final key, i.e., when the channel noise (including the disturbance caused by Eve’s attack) is higher than the threshold
of the protocol itself. The “efficiency” is defined by the threshold of the channel noise for the protocol. If the channel
noise is larger than that, Alice and Bob will obtain zero bit for their final key. In almost all proven unconditionally
secure protocols so far, the efficiency is dependent on the channel error rate, but it is independent of the channel error
pattern itself, i.e., no matter it is a coherent error or uncorrelated error, the threshold is the same. These protocols are
unconditional secure with threshold value of noise which is universal to all noise patterns, correlated or uncorrelated.
Here in our protocol, the threshold is dependent on the channel error pattern while the security is independent of
the error pattern (which is required by the term “unconditional security”). Note that our protocol is totally different
from the ones with a conditional security. Our protocol is unconditionally secure with a conditional advantage in
noise threshold.
Security proof of a QKD protocol is normally related to the channel noise. Here we shall use the term “s-channel”
for the physical channel which is supposed to transmit the qubits from Alice to Bob. This s-channel can be an optical
fiber, or can be just the nature. We shall use the term “r-channel” for the actual channel in the QKD, the noise of
“r-channel” is supposed to be under control of Eve. in the security proof. In particular, if there is no Eve., r-channel
is just s-channel. Suppose Alice and Bob decide to do QKD through a certain s-channel (e.g., optical fiber F) by
using Gottesman-Lo protocol [6,16]. Before they do so they have been very sure of the propeties of their s-channel
noise. They find the channel noise is all independent to each qubit and the bit error rate of that s-channel is 21%.
(It is to many people’s intution that the errors should be independent if the different qubits are spatially separated
sufficiently. Also we can choose to use the type of fiber which only causes independent errors to qubits.) In such
a case, if we are limitted to the previously proposed 4-state prepare-and-measure protocols, we can do nothing for
the quantum key distribution because the error rate is larger than the thresholds of all those protocols. However, in
our protocol, Alice will first encode each BB84 qubit by a 2-qubit quantum error-rejection code and then send each
quantum code to Bob. Bob will first take the parity check and decoding after ha receives the codes. He will test
the error rate and distill the final key with Alice after decoding. Due to the fault tolerance property of the error
rejection code, the error rate of the raw bits after decoding is expected to be reduced and the net effect here is that
our 4-state protocol can tolerate an error rate up to 26% for the s-channel. In the supposed case of 21% error rate
for the symmetric s-channel where all errors are independent, our protocol will still work.
The advantage of a higher error threshold is not an unconditional advantage. It is only for the cases where the
2-qubit error rejection code indeed works. One example is that the channel only causes uncorrelated errors. However,
the security of our protocol is unconditional. That is to say, no matter what type of attack Eve. may use, the final
key obtained by our protocol is always secure. In a real QKD process the qubits could be transmitted through Eve.
or the property of s-channel could be changed due to Eve’s attack therefore the 2-qubit error-rejection code does not
work properly as what is expected. In such a case, after decoding, Alice and Bob will find that the error rate is
unexpectedly high and they will choose to either abort all the raw bits or continue the rest steps of the protocol and
obtain a shorter final key to which Eve.’s information is exponentially close to 0. But in cases there is no Eve., or
Eve.’s attack is insignificant, the 2-bit error-rejection code works perfectly or almost perfectly, the advantage of our
protocol appears: one can obtain the final key in the case that the s-channel noise is higher than the thresholds of all
previously known secure prepare-and-measure protocols.
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If Eve always disturbs the qubits very sigficantly, our protocol will not work at all even though the error rate of
s-channel is lower than the threshold. However, in such a case no protocol will work. A quantitative comparison of
different protocols on Eve’s cost to destroy a protocol or to shorten the final key is not a topic of this work.
III. GOTTESMAN-LO PROTOCOL: ERROR-REJECTION AND ERROR-CORRECTION
There are many ways to do entanglement purification. However, not all of them can be used for the security proof
of a QKD protocol without using quantum storage. To carry out such a task one must first study an entanglement
purification based QKD protocol and then show that the protocol is classicalizable, i.e., to show that it is equivalent
to the case where Alice measures all her halves of entangled pairs initially and continue with all other steps in the
protocol. Different types of EPP may tolerate different flipping rates of the channel. We now first analyse the reason
why the currently existing protocols [6,16] does not reach the theoretically allowed threshold of the channel flipping
rate. To prove a secure QKD protocol, one may first consider an entanglement purification protocol and then find out
the corresponding QKD protocol based on that. In general, one has two simple ways to purify entangled pairs shared
by spatially separated parties, Alice and Bob. One method is the error-rejection [10]: The raw pairs are randomly
divided into many 2-pair groups. To each group, Alice and Bob measure the parity on each side. If they obtain the
same parity value, they discard the target pair and keep the control pair (see Fig. 1). If the parity values are different,
they discard both pairs. In doing the parity check, they can choose the measurement basis of Z1Z2 to reduce the bit
flip errors or the basis of X1X2 to reduce the phase flip errors. Suppose the initially shared raw pairs between Alice
and Bob bear the σx, σy , σz errors are px, py, pz, respectively. Let pI = 1 − px − py − pz. After one round of bit-flip
error-rejection, the error rate for the survived pairs is changing by the following iteration formula as given by Chau
[16]:


pEPI =
p2I + p
2
z
(pI + pz)2 + (px + py)2
,
pEPx =
p2x + p
2
y
(pI + pz)2 + (px + py)2
,
pEPy =
2pxpy
(pI + pz)2 + (px + py)2
,
pEPz =
2pIpz
(pI + pz)2 + (px + py)2
.
(1)
Exchange px and pz above we can obtain the iteration formula by phase error-rejection operation. By taking the
error-rejection operation alternately in Z basis and X basis for many rounds, one can always distill out maximally
entangled pairs asymptotically from the raw state ρ if 〈Φ+|ρ|Φ+〉 > 1/2, where |Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉). This is to say,
with the error-rejection method, the theoretical upper bound of tolerable channel flipping rate for QKD distribution
can be reached. For the symmetric channel, the bit-flip rate or the phase-flip rate can be as high as 33.3% no
matter whether we use the 4-state protocol or 6-state protocol. However, the error-rejection method above cannot
be clasicalized to the prepare-and-measure QKD protocol since if Alice had measured her halves in Z basis initially,
Alice and Bob would have no way to take phase-flip error-rejection. Note that the error-rejection method means they
have to decide whether they should keep one bit or discard both bits according to the measurement result.
To overcome this barrier, Gottesman and Lo proposed to use the error-correction method to reduce the phase-flip
error: they correct a possible error by [3, 1, 3]2 code instead of discarding the the corrupted pairs, once a possible
error is detected. To do so, Alice and Bob randomly choose 3 pairs in one group. They each measure the parity of
qubits 2,3 and qubit 1,2 and compare both values (Fig. 2). After the comparison, they decide whether to take a flip
operation to pair 1. They keep pair 1 and discard pair 2 and pair 3. With a high probability that pair one is now free
of phase flip error if the parity checks are done in X basis. However the tolerable initial error rate is decreased with
this method towards the distillation of maximally entangled pairs. This implies that the error-rejection can be more
effective than error-correction in the entanglement distillation.
In Gottesman-Lo QKD protocol, Alice and Bob distill the classical bits as if they were distilling the entangled pairs:
no one knows whether Alice had measured her halves of the entangled pairs initially. Therefore the security of the
protocol is equivalent to that in a real entanglement distillation protocol, which has been proved to be unconditionally
secure [3].
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Gottesman-Lo protocol reduces the bit flip error by error-rejection and reduces the phase flip error by error-
correction. Although in the case of real entanglement distillation, Alice may often need to phase flip certain qubit
according to the parity comparison result for phase-flip error-correction in the entanglement purification protocol.
However, if the final purpose is to set up the faithful and secure key only, Alice need not really take any phase flip.
Instead, she may simply use the parity of randomly chosen 3 bits as the new bit value after “error-correction” (see
Fig.2).
The phase flip does not affect the final bit result therefore omitting the phase flip will not affect the reliability of
the final key. That is, the final key is as faithful as that in the case Alice takes phase flip to her qubits as required
by the standard entanglement purification. Moreover, one can also find that omitting the phase flip operation does
not affect the security either. Consider the case that Alice never takes phase flip to her qubit but she keeps the
information in the mind that which qubit should be phase flipped and then continue the distillation, they will finally
obtain |χ1〉 ⊗ |χ2〉 · · · |χn〉. Each |χi〉 is either |Φ+〉 or |Φ−〉 = 1√2 (|00〉 − |11〉) and Alice explicitly knows the state of
each pair (with a probability exponentially close to 1). That is to say, if Alice never takes any phase flip, Alice and Bob
will share a product of different maximally entangled state. Note that the shared pairs are in a pure state. Therefore
those shared pairs, with a probability exponentially close to 1, are unentangled with any third party. The security in
such a case is totally equivalent to the case where all shared pairs are in state |Φ+〉. Further, even Alice never keeps
any information in her mind on which qubit should be phase flipped, the security is unchanged. Because even in such
a case, the finally distilled pairs are also unentangled with any third party. The only thing that is important here is
that Alice would be able to know the state of finally distilled pairs if she had remembered the information on which
qubit should be phase flipped.
One may further reduce the above protocol. Taking the fact that the phase flip operation can actually be ignored,
Alice can then choose to measure each of her halves of EPR pair in Z basis initially and send the other halves to
Bob and then carry out the same entanglement purification scheme as if they were sharing the entangled pairs. This
reduction should not affect the reliability of Bob’s final key because it does not affect any bit value in Z basis. Note
that the operation commutes with all operations taken by Alice latter on. This reduction should be as secure as
before because Eve will never know whether Alice had measured her halves of EPR pairs in the beginning, even with
the full collaboration with Bob. Suppose the reduction at this step is insecure. We have already known that the final
key is secure if Alice had not measured her halves of pairs . Then we shall get the confliction that Eve. and Bob
will be able to know whether Alice had measured her qubits in the beginning by checking whether Bob’s final key is
significantly correlated with Eve’s assumed key.
From the above analysis we spot one important fact in Gottesman-Lo protocol [6] and its modified version [16]:
Alice and Bob are only allowed to take error-correction but not allowed to take error-rejection operation to treat the
phase flip error, otherwise it cannot be classicalized. But error-rejection operation can be more effective in removing
errors. This is the reason why the error rate threshold cannot reach the theoretically allowed value, i.e., the threshold
for the real entanglement distillation with all error-rejection method.
IV. PHASE-FLIP ERROR REJECTION WITH 2-QUBIT ERROR REJECTION CODE.
To improve the tolerable channel error rate threshold in quantum key distribution, one may naturally consider the
possibility of using error-rejection method to reduce the phase error also. Naively, one may consider the real 2-EPP.
But that requires the quantum storage which is obviously impractical with our current technology. However, with the
quantum error-rejection code as we are going into, one can take the error-rejection quantumly therefore any quantum
storage is unnecessary. However, if we want to use quantum phase error-rejection code to remove the phase flip error
in all rounds, we must then use a large concatenated quantum code which is also impractical. Keeping this point in
mind, we choose to use quantum error-rejection only at the first round therefore we only need a 2-bit quantum code
to encode each initial qubits with Alice:
|0〉|0〉 −→ (|00〉+ |11〉)/
√
2
|1〉|0〉 −→ (|00〉 − |11〉)/
√
2. (2)
Here the second |0〉 state qubit in the left hand side of the arrow is the ancilla for the encoding. This code is not
assumed to reduce the errors to qubits in all cases. But in the case that the channel noise is uncorrelated or nearly
uncorrelated, it works effectively. We shall consider the ideal case that the channel errors are uncorrelated here.
Therefore the initial perfect EPR pair |Φ+〉 with Alice is encoded by the following formula before sending half of it
Bob over noisy channel:
E[|φ+〉] = 1
2
[|0〉A(|0〉B1|0〉B2 + |1〉B1|1〉B2) + |1〉A(|0〉B1|0〉B2 − |1〉B1|1〉B2)] (3)
5
Alice then sends qubits B1 and B2 to Bob. In receiving them, Bob first takes a parity check, i.e. measures Z1Z2. Note
that this measurement does not destroy the code state itself. Moreover, any linear superposition of |00〉 and |11〉 is an
eigenstate of Z1Z2 with eigenvalue 0; any linear superposition of |01〉 and |10〉 is an eigenstate of Z1Z2 with eigenvalue
1. If he obtains 1, Alice and Bob discards the code, if he obtains 0, Bob decodes the code: he takes a measurement in
X basis to one qubit (say, B1), if he obtains |+〉, he takes a Hadamard transformation H = 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
to the other
qubit (B2); if he obtains |−〉 for qubit B1, he takes the Hadamard transformation to qubit B2 and then flips qubit
B2 in Z basis. In such a way, Alice and Bob may share the raw pairs of qubit A and B2. The phase flip error to the
survived raw pairs will be decreased. Suppose the channel error rates of σx, σy , σz types are px0, py0, pz0, respectively.
Let pI0 = 1 − px0 − py0 − pz0. With a probability of p2I0 there is no error to both qubit B1 and B2. In such a case,
the state after decoding is exactly |Φ+〉. Explicitly, with no flip happens the total state for A, B1 and B2 before
decoding is
E|Φ+〉 = |0〉A(|+〉B1|+〉B2 + |−〉B1|−〉B2) + |1〉A(|+〉B1|−〉B2 + |−〉B1|+〉B2). (4)
Note that the total state is symmetric to qubit B1 and B2. Suppose Bob takes measurement in X basis to qubit
B1 for the decoding. From the formula above we can see that the state for qubits A and B2 will be collapsed to
|0〉|+〉+ |1〉|−〉 if he obtains |+〉 for qubit B1, after a Hadamard transformation, the shared pair is changed to |Φ+〉
for sure. Qubits A and B2 will be collapsed to |0〉|+〉 − |1〉|+〉 if he obtains |−〉 for qubit B1. In such a case, he will
first take a Hadamard transformation to B2 and then flip it in Z basis. After these operations, the shared pair is also
changed back to state |Φ+〉 for sure. If one of the transmitted qubit bears a bit flip error (including both σx and σy
error) while the other transmitted qubit does not bear the bit flip error (e.g., it can be of no error or of σz error), the
code will be discarded for sure after the parity check. The probability for this type of event is 2(px0+ py0)(pI0 + pz0).
If both transmitted qubits bear bit flip errors with arbitrary phase flip errors, or none of them suffer a bit flip error
with arbitrary phase flips, the 2-qubit code will pass the parity check and be accepted. In such a case Alice and Bob
will share a wrong state after decoding. However, the probability for such cases are small. We list the probability
distribution for all possible states after decoding in the following table:
joint channel error probability state after decoding raw pair error
I ⊗ I p2I0 |φ+〉 I
{I ⊗ σz} 2pI0pz0 |ψ+〉 σx
σz ⊗ σz p2z0 |φ+〉 I
{σy ⊗ σy} p2y0 |φ−〉 σz
{σx ⊗ σx} p2x0 |φ−〉 σz
{σx ⊗ σy} 2px0py0 |ψ−〉 σy
We use {α⊗β} to denote both α⊗β and β⊗α in the most left column above. There are other types of joint errors to
the two transmitted qubits besides those listed in the above table. However, all codes with those types of unlisted joint
channel errors will be discarded after Bob’s parity check operation. After renormalize the probability distribution for
each term in the above table we can obtain the error rate distribution for the survived raw pairs shared by Alice and
Bob.


pI =
p2I0 + p
2
z0
(pI0 + pz0)2 + (px0 + py0)2
,
pz =
p2x0 + p
2
y0
(pI0 + pz0)2 + (px0 + py0)2
,
py =
2px0py0
(pI0 + pz0)2 + (px0 + py0)2
,
px =
2pI0pz0
(pI0 + pz0)2 + (px0 + py0)2
.
(5)
With this formula, the phase flip error to the shared raw pairs is obviously reduced. The formula is similar to the
error-rejection formula by directly measuring the parity of two pairs on each side. Therefore such a code can be
more effective than [3, 1, 3]2 error correction code in reducing phase-flip errors and can cause advantages to the QKD
protocols. Note that it is a bit subtle that the phase error to the decoded state is caused by bit-flip channel errors.
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V. ENTANGLEMENT ASSISTED PROTOCOL.
We first consider the following entanglement purification based protocol with quantum storages:
0 Before they carry out the protocol, Alice and Bob test there channels by the error rejection code in above
section. They find Eq.(5) alomost always (approximately) holds.
1 Alice prepare N copies of EPR state |Φ+〉, |Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉A|0〉B1+ |1〉A|1〉B1). She also prepares N ancilla qubits
which are all in state |0〉. We shall use the subscript B2 for each of theses N ancilla qubits. To each pair, she
will keep qubit A with herself.
2 Alice takes unitary transformation given in Eq.(2) to qubits B1 and B2. B1 and B2 are now the phase-flip
quantum error-rejection code for the original state of qubit B1. Now the total state of qubit A, B1, B2 is in the
form of eq.(3).
3 Alice sends each 2-qubit code (B1,B2) to Bob and keeps qubits A.
4 Bob takes parity check to each 2-bit code in basis of |0〉〈0|, |1〉〈1|. That is, Bob measures ZB1ZB2. He discards
both of them whenever he obtains 1 and stores both qubits whenever he obtains 0.
5 Bob decodes each of the survived 2-bit code: To each code that has passed the parity check, he measures one
qubit (e.g., qubit B1) in X basis. If he obtains |+〉, he takes a Hadamard transformation to the other qubit
(qubit B2) and saves it as the decoded qubit; if he obtains |−〉 as the measurement result for B1, he will first
take a Hadamard transformation to B2 and then flip B2 in Z basis and save it as the decoded qubit.
6 Bob announces which codes have passed the parity check and have been decoded. Alice discards those qubits
with her which were entangled with Bob’s discarded codes. Now Alice and Bob share a number of raw entangled
pairs with each of them containg qubit A and qubit B2. Alice then randomly chooses a number of her qubits
and measure each of them in either Z basis or X basis. She announces which qubits have been chosen and the
measurement basis and results of each of them. According to her announcement, Bob measures his halves of
those raw pairs in the same basis as chosen by Alice. He compares his measurement results with those announced
by Alice. If too many of them disagree, they abort the game and then restart from the beginning. If the error
rate is acceptable, they continue the game with the following steps [18].
7 Alice and Bob then take the bit-flip error-rejection [6]: they divide the rest of the survived raw pairs into many
2-pair groups. The two pairs for each individual groups are randomly chosen. They measure the parity of each
group in Z basis at each side and compare the results. They discard those groups whose parities on two sides
disagree; they discard the target pair and keep the control pair (see Fig.1)if the results at two sides agree with
each other. They can repeatedly take this bit-flip error correction for g round.
8 They can then take the [r, 1, r]2 phase-flip error-correction code as proposed in [16] to reduce the phase-flip
error. They should choose the appropriate g and r value so that both bit-flip error and phase-flip error are small
enough therefore the shared pairs can be distilled to maximally entangled by a certain classicalizable distillation
method in the next step.
9 They further purify the survived pairs by a classicalizable distillation method so that the error rate of their
shared pairs are exponentially small. The classicalizable distillation method means the method which can be
reduced to an equivalent prepare-and measure scheme [6] where no quantum storage is required.
Note that this scheme requires the quantum storage. We shall classicalize it to an equivalent form latter therefore
a quantum storage is unnecessary. For the moment we first calculate the largest tolerable channel error rate of the
protocol.
The two-qubit error-rejection code decreases the phase flip error and increases the bit flip error of the shared raw
pairs. After the quantum decoding Alice and Bob will reduce the bit flip error rate by bit flip error-rejection. The
error rate for the survived pairs after one round bit flip error-rejection is given by Eq.(1). This is the formula which
is used iteratively in the multi-rounds bit-flip error-rejection. In doing the error rejection for bit-flip error, the phase
flip rate and also perhaps the total error rate is increased. After some rounds of bit flip error rejection, one must then
reduce to the phase flip error rate by the scheme of phase flip error-correction. In the original Gottesman-Lo protocol,
[3, 1, 3]2 code is used. Actually, any [r, 1, r]2 error correction code can be used for that task and any [r, 1, r]2 can be
classicalized [16]. In our protocol, we have followed Chau’s protocol: carry out the bit flip error-rejection repeatedly
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and use an appropriate [r, 1, r]2 code to reduce the phase error. After the phase error correction, the new error rates
satisfy the following inequalities provided that pI > 1/2.
{
pPECx + p
PEC
y ≤ r(px + py),
pPECy + p
PEC
z ≤ [4(pI + pz)(px + py)]r/2 ≤ e−2r(0.5−pz−py)
2
,
(6)
This shows that, given px0, py0, pz0, if there exits a finite number k, after k rounds of bit-flip error-rejection, we can
find a r which satisfy
r(px + py) ≤ 5%
e−2r(0.5−pz−py)
2 ≤ 5%. (7)
One can then obtain the unconditional secure and faithful final key with a further purification through any classical-
izable methods.
To the above 4-state protocol, even though py0 value is not detected, we don’t have to assume py0 = 0. We actually
need not to know it. What we need to know is each types of error rates to the raw pairs, i.e. px, py, pz. Based on
the information of px, py, pz we then decide whether the shared raw pairs are distillable by the remained steps in the
scheme. In other words, this is equivalent to the case where Alice directly sends the EPR halves to Bob through an
un-symmetric noisy channel with flip rates of px, py, pz instead of px0, py0, pz0. That is to say, the role of the quantum
phase flip error-rejection code is to replace the natural channel error rate px0, py0, pz0 by the effective channel error
rate of px, py, pz which are linked by eq.(5). Note that a quantum bit-flip error-rejection code will not help to improve
the tolerable error rate of Gottesman-Lo protocol [6] because the effect of that is equivalent to that of the classical
bit-flip error-rejection as used there. In the 4-state protocol, we don’t detect the σy error therefore we have to assume
py = 0 after the quantum parity check and decoding. This shows that, if the channel noise is symmetric, after the
quantum decoding, both σz error and σy error are reduced, i.e., the detectable phase error rate( including both σz
and σy error rate) has been reduced in a rate as it should be in the case of symmetric noisy channel. We then start
from the un-symmetric error rate with assumption py = 0 and px, pz being the detected bit-flip rate and phase-flip
rate, respectively. After the calculation, we find that the tolerable error rate of bit flip or phase flip is 26% for the
4-state protocol. Moreover, in the case that the channel error itself is un-symmetric, e.g., py0 = 0; px0 = pz0, the
tolerable channel error rate for our protocol is px0 = pz0 ≤ 21.7%.
VI. THE PROTOCOL WITHOUT QUANTUM STORAGE
The above QKD scheme requires a quantum storage for both Alice and Bob. This is impractical by our current
technology. However, the scheme can be reduced to an equivalent scheme which does not require a quantum storage.
We now show it in details.
In the protocol above, the phase-flip quantum error-correction code of [r, 1, r] is used [16]. This is equivalent to the
classical method of replacing the r bits by one new bit whose value is just the parity of those r bits [16]. For example,
one may consider the case of r = 3. As it was shown in Ref. [6], the parity measurement in X basis can be replaced by
the equivalent one in Z basis, see Fig.2. The actual operation is just to replace the bit value of qubit 1 by the parity
of 3 qubits. More generally, the [3, 1, 3]2 error correction code can be replaced by [r, 1, r]2 code with the majority
rule, i.e., replacing the original one bit value by the parity of r bits [16]. The initial EPR pairs prepared by Alice
will be treated in three different ways: some of them will be used as the check pairs; some of them will be discarded
after the parity check before decoding; some of them will be used for the entanglement distillation. To those check
pairs, Alice’s only operation to qubit A is just a measurement in either Z basis or X basis, there is no other operation
therefore Alice can choose to measure qubit A before encoding qubit B1. After Bob’s parity check before decoding,
some quantum codes will be discarded. The discarded codes do not affect any results of final key, therefore Alice may
choose to measure qubit A initially in any basis to each of those qubits. To those qubits which will be used for the
distillation, Alice’s all operations are done in Z basis, therefore Alice can choose to measure all those qubits A in Z
basis before encoding B1. Moreover, instead of preparing each single qubits and then encoding them with ancilla by
Hadamard transformation and C-NOT gate, Alice may directly prepare the error rejection code and put down the
bit value corresponding to the code. That is, code |00〉, |11〉, 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) and 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉) correspond to single
qubit state |+〉, |−〉, |0〉, |1〉 respectively.
With the above arguments, the protocol can be revised to the following protocol without a quantum storage:
1 Alice prepares N 2-qubit quantum codes with each of them randomly chosen from the set {|00〉, |11〉, 1√
2
(|00〉 ±
|11〉)}. Among all of them, N/4 of them are prepared in |00〉 or |11〉 with equal probability and 3N/4 of them
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are prepared in 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉) with equal probability. She records the the “preparation basis” as X basis for
code |00〉 or |11〉; and as Z basis for code 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉) [19]. And she records the bit value of 0 for the code
|00〉 or 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉); bit value 1 for the code |11〉 or 1√
2
(|00〉− |11〉). She sends each randomly chosen 2-qubit
codes to Bob.
2 Bob takes parity check to each 2-qubit code in Z basis. That is, Bob measures ZB1ZB2. He discards the codes
whenever he obtains 1 and he takes the following measurement if he obtains 0 in the parity check: he measures
one qubit in X basis and the other qubit in either X basis or Z basis with equal probability. Bob makes a record
of his “measurement basis” to the decoded qubit as Z basis ( {|0〉, |1〉}) if he measures “the other qubit” in basis
X basis ({|±〉}); and he records his “measurement basis” as X basis if he measures “the other qubit” in Z basis
[20]. If he obtains |+〉|+〉, |+〉|0〉, |−〉|−〉 or |−〉|0〉, he records bit value 0 for that code; if he obtains |−〉|+〉,
|−〉|1〉, |+〉|−〉 or |+〉|1〉, he records bit value 1 for that code.
3 Alice announces her records of “preparation basis” of each qubit; Bob compares his measurement basis with
Alice’s announced “preparation basis”. He discards those bit values whose measurement basis disagree with
Alice’s announcement. Bob announces which qubits are survived. Bob announces the bit value for those qubits
whose “preparation basis” and “measurement basis” are X. He also randomly chooses the same number of bits
whose “preparation basis” and “measurement basis” are Z. He announces their bit values. If too many of them
disagree with Alice’s record, they abort the protocol.
4 They reduce the bit flip rate by the following way: they randomly group all their unchecked bits with each
group containing 2 bits. They compare the parity of each group. If the results are different, they discard both
bits. If the results are same, they discard one bit and keep the other. They repeatedly do so for a number of
rounds until they believe that both bit flip rate and phase flip rate will be reduced to less than 5% with the
next step being taken.
5 They then randomly group the remained bits with each group containing r bits. They use the parity of each
group as the new bits.
6 They use any other proven secure classical methods to further reduce the error rate until both bit flip rate and
phase flip rate are negligible, e.g. less than 2−50. Here “other classical methods” includes the Gottesman-Lo
method [6], the classical CSS code [13], the concatenated 7-bit code [16] and so on.
The above classicalized protocol is totally equivalent to the one based on entanglement purification in the previous
section, therefore it tolerates the same channel error rate as that that of the entanglement purification based protocol.
That is to say, this classicalized 4-state protocol can tolerate a channel flipping rate of 26%. Although the quantum
storage is removed now, it still requires the parity check and decoding operation for Bob. We now show how to make
it with ordinary linear optics devices.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL REALIZATION.
The 2-qubit codes in our protocol above can be robustly produced form SPDC process [5]. In such a polarization
space, |0〉, |1〉 are represented by the horizontal polarization state and vertical polarization state. In the “classicalized”
protocol above, Bob need to take the operation of quantum parity check and quantum decoding to the codes received
from Alice. In practice, Bob can take the two operation together with a polarizing beam splitter and obtain the result
by post-selection. Bob’s operation to the incoming 2-qubit code is shown in Fig.(3). If he obtains nothing in either D1
or D2 measurement, he aborts the code; if there is one photon on each side of the PBS, he records the bit value and
“measurement basis” according to the correspondence rule in step 2 in the protocol. Note that a PBS transmits the
horizontal qubits and reflects the vertical qubits. In Alice’s initial preparation of the quantum code, the two qubits
have the same polarization. If one of them is flipped in Z basis by the channel, the code will contain two different
polarizations and both photons will be on the same side of the PBS, i.e., either D1 or D2 will be vacuum, therefore
the code will be discarded. To verify the fact of one photon on each side of the PBS, Bob only needs to see that
both photon detectors on each side of the PBS click. Note that we only need yes-no photon detectors here. The low
efficiency of the detectors does not affect the security of the protocol.
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VIII. 6-STATE PROTOCOL
Our protocol can obviously be extended to the 6-state protocol. In doing so, Alice just change the initially random
codes by adding N/4 codes from { 12 [(|00〉 + |11〉) ± i(|00〉−〉|11〉)]}. This is equivalent to 1√2 ({|00〉 ∓ i|11〉)}. She
regards all this type codes as Y bits. In decoding the codes, Bob’s “measurement basis” is randomly chosen from 3
basis, with the basis of 1√
2
(|0〉± i|1〉) being added. All decoded X bits, Y bits and the same number of decoded Z bits
which are randomly chosen will be used as the check bits. Since the Hadamard transformation will switch the two
eigenstates of σy , therefore in classicalized protocol, after the decoding if Bob choose to take the measurement to B2
qubit in Y basis, he shall records his “measurement basis” as Y but the “measurement outcome” should be flipped
in the Y basis so that to obtain everything the same as that in the 2-EPP with quantum storages. In such a way, if
the channel is symmetric, Bob will find py 6= 0. And he will know px, py, pz exactly instead of assuming py = 0. This
will increase the tolerable error rate accordingly. We find that the tolerable bit flip rate and phase flip rate are 30%
in such a case, i.e., our 6-state protocol can tolerate a total flip rate of 45% with the symmetric noisy channel.
IX. ANOTHER VIEWPOINT OF OUR PROTOCOLS
To further clarify the concept of unconditional security with conditional advantage in efficiency of our protocols,
here we view our scheme from a another viewpoint. We denote channel between Alice and Bob by operator Cˆ, i.e.
a transmitted qubit will be interacted with channel by that operator. We can now compare Chau protocol [16] with
our protocol given the same channel Cˆ. In our protocol, if we can also regard the Alice’s quantum encoding part
and Bob’s quantum decoding part as part of the channel interaction. In such a case, our protocol with channel Cˆ is
actually just the Chau protocol [16] with a lossy channel
Cˆ′ = DˆCˆEˆ (8)
where the operators Eˆ, Dˆ represent for encoding and decoding respectively. Note that so far all the known secure
protocols are also secure with a lossy channel, since the purification scheme can be done with a lossy channel, with
the device imperfections such as dark counting being ignored here. The error rates for channel Cˆ′ are functions of
the error rates of channel Cˆ. In particular, they are related by Eq.(5) if errors caused by Cˆ are uncorrelated. To
whatever channel, the error rate should satisfy the same convergence condition to produce non zero bits of final key.
Specifically, we can use the following formula for the convergence condition:
f(px0, py0, pz0) ≤ η (9)
for channel Cˆ and
f(Px, Py, Pz) ≤ η (10)
for channel Cˆ′ where (px0, py0, pz0) and (Px, Py , Pz) are detected error rates for channel Cˆ and channel Cˆ′, respectively.
η is a small number, say 5%. Though the above 2 equations have the same form, Eq.(10) requires a different
convergence condition to (px0, py0, pz0). If the error rates of Channel Cˆ
′ and that of channel Cˆ are related by eq.(5),
then we can solve the condition of formula (10) numerically and obtain the thresholds to (px0, py0, pz0), which is just
the claimed threshold in our protocols.
Roughly speaking, our protocol is equivalent to the one which first investigates the channel properties and then find
a scheme to reduce the s-channel noise based on the investigated prpoerties and then carry out Chau protocol [16].
The channel noise is not unconditionally reduced, it is based on the investigated properties of the s-channel itself. At
the time we are really carrying out QKD, Eve. may attack it and the assumed properties is not necessarily true. But
we still believe that the protocol will work in the way as it is assumed in most of the cases for the reasons we have
addressed before. It’s a reasonable assumption that it should be an advantage if we have a way to decrease the noise
of the s-channel, even though in principle Eve. may do everything to the channel in QKD.
X. CONCLUDING REMARK.
We have proposed an entanglement assisted protocol for quantum key distribution. The protocol is unconditionally
secure with a conditional advantage of an improved threshold of the channel error rate. Given the uncorrelated noise of
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s-channel, in 4-state case, the tolerable bit flip or phase flip rate is 26%; in the 6 state case, the values are increased to
30%, if the noise is symmetric. The initial 2-qubit entangled state can be produced through SPDC process [5]. Bob’s
quantum parity check and decoding can be done with a polarizing beam splitter. Obviously, all devices appeared in
our proposed scheme are just ordinary devices in linear optics.
There are also some loosen ends for our protocol in practical realization. In the SPDC process, there are also
some multi-pair emission with small probability. This type of emission will affect the security that should be taken
into consideration for the security proof for a practical entanglement assisted QKD protocol with SPDC process.
We believe this can be solved in the similar idea for the case of imperfection of the single photon source for the
BB84 scheme. We have neither considered the devices imperfections, e.g., the dark counting of the photon detectors.
Neither have we considered the Trojan Horse attack to the protocol. Similar to other QKD proposals [6,16], here
the tolerable upper bound for channel error rate is calculated asymptotically. In practice, the number of qubits sent
to Bob is always finite. With the statistical fluctuation being taken into consideration, the tolerable flip rate of the
channel is decreased in practice with a finite number of initial qubits.
Comparison of measurement results by two way communication
Meas.
Bob’s operation
 1
2
Alice’s operation
Meas.
 1
2
FIG. 1. Controlled-not (C-NOT) operation used for the bit-flip error-rejection. The horizontal lines marked by 1 and 2 are
pair 1 and 2 respectively. Alice and Bob compare the measurement outcomes of the target qubit 2. If they choose Z basis for
C-NOT operation and the measurement, it is equivalent to measure Z1Z2; if they choose to use X basis, it is equivalent to
measure X1X2 on each side.
Meas.
H
H
H H
H
Meas.
Meas.
Meas.
FIG. 2. Two equivalent ways to measure the operators X1X2 and X1X3. This figure is taken from the paper by Gottesman
and Lo.
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D1(+,−)
PBSAlice
D2[(+,−);(0,1)]
Bob
FIG. 3. Bob’s operation for quantum parity check and decoding. The two horizontal lines are the 2-bit code sent by Alice.
PBS is a polarizing beam splitter which transmits horizontally polarized photons and reflects vertically polarized photons.
D represents for measurement. D1(+,−) means a measurement in basis |±〉, D2[(+,−); (0, 1)] means that Bob takes that
measurement in either {|±〉} basis or {|0〉, |1〉 basis.}
Acknowledgement: I thank Prof Imai H for support.
[1] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, “Quantum cryptography: Public-key distribution and coin tossing,” in Proceedings of
IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems and Signal Processing, Bangalore, India, 1984, (IEEE Press,
1984), pp. 175–179; C.H. Bennett and G. Brassard, “Quantum public key distribution,” IBM Technical Disclosure Bulletin
28, 3153–3163 (1985).
[2] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, “Quantum Cryptography,”, Reviews of Modern Physics, vol. 74, pp.
145-195. Also [Online] Available: http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/quant-ph/0101098.
[3] H.-K. Lo and H. F. Chau, “Unconditional security of quantum key distribution over arbitrarily long distances,” Science,
283, 2050(1999)
[4] D. Bruss, Phys. Rev. Lett. 81, 3018(1998).
[5] P. G. Kwiat, K. Mattle, H. Weinfurter, A. Zeilinger, A.V. Sergienko, and Y. H. Shih, Phys. Rev. Lett. 75, 4337(1995).
[6] D. Gottesman and H.-K. Lo, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 49, 457(2003), quant-ph/0105121, “Proof of
security of quantum key distribution with two-way classical communication”.
[7] D. Mayers, “Unconditional security in Quantum Cryptography,” Journal of ACM, vol. 48, Issue 3, p. 351-406. Also [Online]
Available: http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/quant-ph/9802025.
[8] E. Biham, M. Boyer, P. O. Boykin, T. Mor, and V. Roychowdhury, “A proof of the security of quantum key distribution,”
in Proceedings of the Thirty-Second Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC) (ACM Press, New York,
2000), p. 715.
[9] M. Ben-Or, Unpublished.
[10] C. H. Bennett, D. P. DiVincenzo, J. A. Smolin, and W. K. Wootters, “Mixed state entanglement and quantum error
correction,” Phys. Rev., vol. A54, 3824, 1996.
[11] C. H. Bennett, D. P. DiVincenzo, J. A. Smolin and W. K. Wootters, “Mixed state entanglement and quantum error
correction,” Phys. Rev. A, 54, 3824–3851 (1996), arXive e-print quant-ph/9604024.
[12] D. Deutsch, A. Ekert, R. Jozsa, C. Macchiavello, S. Popescu, and A. Sanpera, “Quantum privacy amplification and the
security of quantum cryptography over noisy channels,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 77, p. 2818, 1996. Also, [Online] Available:
http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/quant-ph/9604039. Erratum Phys. Rev. Lett. 80, 2022 (1998).
[13] P. W. Shor and J. Preskill, “Simple proof of security of the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol,” Phys. Rev. Lett.,
vol. 85, p. 441, 2000. Also, [Online] Available: http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/quant-ph/0003004.
[14] D. Gottesman and J. Preskill, “Secure quantum key distribution using squeezed states,” Phys. Rev., vol. A63, p. 22309,
2001.
[15] A. R. Calderbank and P. Shor, “Good quantum error correcting codes exist,” Phys. Rev. A 54, 1098–1105 (1996), arXive
e-print quant-ph/9512032; A. M. Steane, “Multiple particle interference and error correction,” Proc. R. Soc. London A
452, 2551–2577 (1996), arXive e-print quant-ph/9601029.
[16] H. F. Chau, in quant-ph/0206050, “Practical scheme to share a secret key through up to 27.6
[17] H. K. Lo, quant-ph/0201030, “Method for decoupling error correction from privacy amplification”.
[18] We do not have to require that the detected error rate satisfy or approximately satisfy Eq.(5) as the condition of an
acceptable error rate. Even the detected error rates are significantly larger than the expected values given by Eq.(5), they
can still continue the protocol. In such a case they will obtain a much shorter final key to which Eve’s information is
exponentially close to zero. In any case they can carry out the whole protocol and accept the final key provided that they
believe the final key in that length deserves the cost of carrying out the protocol.
12
[19] The “preparation basis” here is defined by the basis of the original qubit which corresponds the 2-qubit code by our
encoding method.
[20] Here Bob has omitted the Hadamard transformation as appeared in the EPP, therefore the measurement basis to B2 and
Bob’s recorded “ measurement basis” to the decoded qubit are different.
13
